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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM TO
BYSTANDERS-SHOULD RECOVERY BE DENIED?
LAWRENCE E. LIKAR
The common law system of jurisprudence has always displayed a reluctance to allow the recovery of damages for emotional harm,' as evidenced by
early judicial decisions which denied a plaintiff recovery for emotional
distress unless he suffered an accompanying physical injury. 2 This blanket
denial of recovery was based upon a belief that the occurrence of emotional
injury depended upon the individual personality of the person affected, 3 and
4
therefore, a correct determination of money damages was impossible.
Moreover, the courts feared that if such recovery was allowed, a flood of
unjust claims would result. 5 Because of later advances in the fields of
medicine and psychiatry, courts began to award damages for emotional
distress without predicating such recovery upon accompanying physical
injury. 6 In general, such recovery was, and still is, subject to the requirement
that the plaintiff must have suffered physical impact or that the claimant
1. Margruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REy. 1033, 1035 (1936). This propensity is aptly pointed out by the frequently cited
statement by Lord Wensleydale that "[miental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone
." Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
2. E.g., Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (Ill. 1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute &
I.R.R., 47 N.E. 694, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1897); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 47 N.E. 88,
89 (Mass. 1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896).
If the injured plaintiff brought his action for an independent tort and also for resulting emotional distress the courts would generally allow damages for such emotional distress as parasitic to the primary injury. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67, at 154-56 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 52 (4th
ed. 1971); see, e.g., Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 58 N.E.2d 517, 518 (N.Y.
i944) (nuisance); Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 100 N.E. 430, 432
(N.Y. 1912) (defamation); Goodell v. Tower, 58 A. 790, 792 (Vt. 1904) (malicious
prosecution).
3. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1, 9-10 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 891 (D.C. Cir.
1952); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896); Huston v. Borough
of Freemasonburg, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (Pa. 1905).
5. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897); Bosley v. Andrews, 142
A.2d 263, 266-67 (Pa. 1958); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REv.
260, 273-74 (1921).
6. See Battalla v. State, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (1961); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175
A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1961); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944
(1900).
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must have been within the zone of actual or apparent danger. 7 Some
jurisdictions, however, have allowed recovery for emotional distress without
these requirements. 8 These jurisdictions determine liability by using a general negligence approach, predicating liability upon a finding that the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of emotional
harm to a normal person in the plaintiff's position. 9
By utilizing this general negligence approach a small minority of jurisdictions have recently allowed a bystander to recover for emotional distress
suffered upon viewing the negligent infliction of physical harm to another.10
In allowing such recovery this small minority has expanded a defendant's
potential liability for the negligent infliction of emotional distress to include
all who could have foreseeably suffered emotional harm from viewing the
7. The earliest limiting factor on recovery was the requirement of a prior or contemporaneous impact coupled with emotional shock. See, e.g., Kentucky Traction &
Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky. 1929); Herrick v. Evening
Express Publishing Co., 113 A. 16, 17 (Me. 1921) (if no bodily injury, there is no basis
from which to draw a conclusion of mental suffering); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d
351, 354 (Pa. 1961) (any degree of physical impact is assurance that the mental damages are legitimate).
Some courts recognized the inequities of the impact rule and began to allow a plaintiff
to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress, if in the absence of physical impact the plaintiff had fear for his own safety at the time of the traumatic event, or if
he was within the zone of physical danger from the event. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co.,
21 A.2d 402, 405 (Conn. 1941) (zone of danger); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879,
882-83 (Md. 1952) (zone of danger); Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J. 1965)
(fear of personal injury).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress was granted protection without limiting
factors. See Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349, 351 (Ariz. 1954); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 285 (Cal. 1952) (interest in freedom from emotional
distress deserves legal protection). The intentional infliction of emotional distress has
been accorded the status of a separate tort by the American Law Institute as stated in
the following:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1.) (1965). The intentional infliction of emotional distress will be discussed only for purposes of comparison, as its development and
legal application is decidedly different from that of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
8. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 242, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (1900)
(proximate cause and foreseeability determine liability for infliction of emotional distress); Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress all that is necessary is a causal connection).
9. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 242, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (1900).
10. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1075 (1973); Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping
Co., 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973); Leong v. Ta-kasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Hawaii
1974); Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); D'Ambra v.
United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975). Contra, Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp.
453, 458 (D. Ore. 1962); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
44 (1963) (rule in California before Dillon); Tobin v. Grossman, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
561-62 (1969); Williamson v. Bennett, 112 S.E.2d 48, 55 (N.C. 1960); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935).
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defendant's negligent act. The question, then, is whether this trend is a
beneficial progression in the area of tort law or whether it imposes an undue
burden upon a merely negligent defendant.
In examining the issue of bystander recovery, two essential problems are
presented: (1) the realistic and accurate compensation for emotional distress
and (2) determining the limits of liability if recovery is allowed. In arriving
at an answer to these problems, first the etiology of emotional distress from a
medical standpoint will be examined. Second, it will be necessary to compare
recent cases in the jurisdictions which allow a bystander to recover for
emotional distress to determine the judicial limitations that have been
imposed upon such recovery. Finally, the position of the Texas courts on
bystander recovery will be examined.
ETIOLOGY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Nature of Emotional Distress
Although the problem of bystander recovery is ultimately a legal issue, to
fully understand its implications the problem must be viewed in light of
current medical theory on emotional distress. Although judicial definitions
vary, from a medical standpoint emotional distress may be defined as a
12
reaction to a traumatic" stimulus which may be physical, psychic, or both.
The reaction itself can be broken down into primary and secondary
stages. 13 The primary stage is the individual's initial reaction to the
traumatic stimulus, and is normally of short duration without lasting ill
effects. 1 4 By way of contrast, the secondary reaction, or traumatic neurosis
as it is commonly termed, develops after the primary stage has diminished
11. From a legal standpoint, trauma has been defined as an injury, wound, shock
or the resulting neurosis. Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Eng'r, 126 So. 2d 556, 561 (Fla.
1961); accord, Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1954); Smith v. Garside, 355 P.2d
849, 852 (Nev. 1960).

12. Brickner, The Psychology of Disability, in TnAUmATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY FOR
THE ATTORNEY 65, 85 (P. Cantor ed. Supp. 1964); Laughlin, Neuroses Following
Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 76, 77 (P. Cantor
ed. 1962). See Gautier v. General Tel. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 404, 408 (Dist. Ct. App.

1965) (a form of injury resulting from tortious conduct); Crews v. Provident Fin. Co.,
157 S.E.2d 381, 386 (N.C. 1967) (madness or anger to the extent of causing an acute
angina condition and substantially increasing the blood pressure).
13. See Adams, Symposium on Trauma: Trauma and the Psychiatrist, in TRAUMA
AN DISEASE: SELECTIONS FROM RECENT LITERATURE 71, 72-73 (A. Moritz & D. He]berg eds. 1959). A legal application of the principles of the primary and secondary

reaction can be found in Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (Hawaii 1974).

14. The primary reaction is characterized by physiological responses caused by the
organism's attempt to achieve equilibrium between the stress to which it has been subjected and the individual's emotional reaction to that stress. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193,
287 (1944); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87, 123

(1944).
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and can entail severe, long-lasting ill effects. There are various types of
secondary reactions, and they can be classified according to their severity. 15 .
Although there is no pathological basis for the development of a traumatic
neurosis, there is no doubt, from a medical viewpoint, that such a neurosis
can cause severe impairment of a person's normal life functions. The
affected individual has no control over the debilitating effects of such a
neurosis as it is the unconscious organism's means of reacting to a severe
emotional shock. 6
Compensation for Emotional Distress

Emotional distress, therefore, develops in the following sequence: traumatic event-primary reaction-possible secondary reaction. The primary
reaction, due to its subjective nature and short17duration, cannot be evaluated
medically and thus proven by expert testimony.
If the traumatic event also causes a secondary reaction, a close scrutiny is
necessary, for although a medical examination can aid in determining the
15. There are five classifications: (1) post traumatic psychoses which entail a serious breakdown in personality functioning; (2) post traumatic neuroses, which develop
due to an individual's inability to cope with the stress to which he has been subjected;
(3) post traumatic hysteria involving functional impairment of a body part; (4) compensation neuroses, which although an actual neurosis, develops because of a mixture
of conscious and unconscious desire for monetary compensation; (5) malingering, which
is characterized by an exaggeration of complaints or manufacturing of symptoms consciously and for profit. Palmer, Mental Reactions Following Injuries in Which There
is No Evidence of Damage to Nervous Tissues, in TRAUMA AND DISEASE: SELECTIONS
FROM RECENT LITERATURE 81, 85-90 (A. Moritz & D. Helberg eds. 1959). The term
traumatic neurosis is used in both legal and medical circles to refer collectively to the
five distinct types of post traumatic neurotic states. Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic
Reactions, in 3B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK

OF MEDICINE

104.01(1), at 104-4

(1972).
Neurosis has been defined as an unconscious effort to display a conflict by developing
symptoms without an organic basis in Turner v. W. Horace Williams Co., 80 So. 2d
162, 163 (La. Ct. App. 1955), or as a "functional nervous disorder without demonstrable
physical lesion," in McGill Mfg. Co. v. Dodd, 59 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. App. Ct. 1945).
16. Schwartz, Neuroses Following Trauma, in 4 TRAUMA 31(1) (1959). Emotional
disabilities are as painful and troubling to the victim as are physical ones. In many
aspects, emotional distress can be more harmful than physical injury, especially since
it is less subject to medical understanding and knowledge. Laughlin, Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICnqE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY 76, 77 (P.
Cantor ed 1962).
17. See Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 212-13 (1944). As a general rule recovery for
the primary reaction alone is not allowed in cases of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Toms v. McConnell, 207
N.W.2d 140, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Laney v. Rush, 152 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, no writ).
[E]motional disturbance which is not so severe and serious as to have physical consequences is normally in the realm of the trivial .

. .

.

It is likely to be so . . .

relatively harmless . . . that the task of compensating for it would unduly burden
the courts and the defendants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, comment b at 461 (1965).
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actual existence of emotional distress and in measuring the portion of
neurosis attributable to the traumatic event, there are problems involved in
both evaluations. In dealing with a secondary reaction it is possible that,
instead of a traumatic neurosis, the reaction is an example of malingering or
a compensation neurosis. Malingering often follows traumatic situations, and
it is difficult to differentiate between the malingerer and those truly emotionally disturbed, since both lack conclusive and identifiable pathologic
changes."" In most instances, however, the malingerer can be discovered by
close medical and psychiatric examination.' 9
The individual suffering from a compensation neurosis presents a more
difficult problem since he actually undergoes neurotic symptoms. In a
compensation neurosis, however, the unconscious desire for secondary
gain-money or sympathy-has encouraged the development of the emotional disability. 20 Moreover, the development of a compensation neurosis is
often aided by an overzealous attorney who can enhance the neurosis by
encouraging the victim's desire for compensation. 21 Although distinctly
different from other secondary reactions, the compensation neurosis does
2
cause severe symptoms such as extreme pain and functional limitations. 2
This fact has persuaded some courts to award damages for such a neurosis in
28
workmen's compensation cases.
While tort cases involving the problems of liability for a compensation
neurosis are virtually nonexistent, recovery for such a neurosis will probably
be denied because it is unlikely that the courts would hold that the
development of a compensation neurosis is foreseeable.2 4 Tort actions
involving emotional distress, however, rarely deal with the problem of
18. Harper, Malingering, in 6 TRAUMATIc MEDicIN AND SURGERY FOR THE ATroR-

35, 40 (P. Cantor ed. 1962).
19. Id. at 42. There are a variety of means by which a malingerer can be detected:
[A] simple test to detect a fraudulent claim of unilateral blindness is carried out
by having the patient read small print and then suddenly placing a pencil 4 inches
in front of the page from which he is reading. If blind in one eye the patient will
stop because one or two words are obscured. Should he be seeing with both eyes
he will continue to read because he can see around the pencil.
Id. at 42-43.
20. Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic Reaction, in 3B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS'

NEY

TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
104.71, at 104-103 (1972); Shannon, Post-Traumatic Neuroses, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 472, 474 (1961).
21. Shannon, Post Traumatic Neuroses, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 472, 474 (1961).
22. See Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic Reaction, in 3B R. GRAY, ATrORNEYS'
TExTBOOK OF MEDICINE
104.71, at 104-103 (1972).

23. Miller v. United States Fidelity &Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511, 520 (La. Ct. App.

1957) (if physical injury is compensable then so is the compensation neurosis); Hood

v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 526, 209 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (1948) (disability flowing from an original compensable injury is itself compensable).
24. See Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164, 171 (Tex. 1967) (compensation
neurosis was a factor in denying recovery for emotional distress); cf. Kowalski v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 164 A. 653, 655

452, 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936).

(Conn. 1933); Swift & Co. v. Ware, 186 S.E.
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compensation neuroses even though it is highly probable that in the majority
of such actions, what are classified as true traumatic neuroses, are actually
compensation neuroses. 25 This situation is probably due to the fact that it
would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff's lawyers to establish the requisite
causal relationship between the negligent act and the resulting compensation
neurosis. As for the defendant's lawyers, perhaps they realize the difficulty in
attempting to prove that an alleged traumatic neurosis is in fact a compensation neurosis and regard such an attack as futile.
Although the determination of authentic emotional distress presents difficulties, the problem of compensation does not end with proof of its existence.
To accurately determine the emotional harm caused to an individual by a
traumatic experience, his predisposition to traumatic events must also be examined. 26 Predisposition or the term "psychological soil" refers to the psychological principle that a person's past life, and the forces at work in his life
at the time of the accident, play a large part in the development of a post
traumatic reaction. 2 7 The principle of predisposition causes adverse secondary
reactions to be unpredictable, because it is undeterminable what seed of reac-

tion was planted in an individual's "psychological soil."'28 Moreover, it is obvious that in an action based on negligence, the presence and effect of the

plaintiff's predisposition could not be deemed foreseeable; consequently, from
a medical standpoint this lack of foreseeability obviates a pure negligence approach to the problem of bystander recovery.29
25. See Kamman, Traumatic Neurosis, Compensation Neurosis or Attitudinal Pathosis?, in TRAUMA AND DISEASE: SELECTIONS FROM RECENT LITERATURE 92, 96-102 (A.
Moritz & D. Helberg eds. 1959).
26. See Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic Reaction, in 3B R. GRAY, ATrORNEYS'
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
104.53(1), at 104-64 (1972); Seizer, Psychic Disabilities
Following Trauma, in C. WECr, LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 389, 392 (1970).
27. Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic Reaction, in 3B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS'
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
104.53, at 104-64 (1972); Selzer, Psychic DisabilitiesFollowing Trauma, in C. WECHT, LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 389, 392 (1970).
Predisposition for mental illness is an important factor and an error will be committed in almost every case if complete responsibility for the neurosis or psychosis
is assigned to the injury, and if the illness potentialities in the background of the
pretraumatic personality are not investigated or are held to be inconsequential.
Palmer, Mental Reactions Following Injuries in Which There Is No Evidence of Damage
to Nervous Tissues, in TRAUMA AND DISEASE: SELECTIONS FROM THE RECENT LITERATURE 81, 84 (A. Moritz & D. Helberg eds. 1959).
28. See G. Moss, ILLNESS, IMMUNITY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 53, 57 (1973).
29. Laughlin, The Emotional Traumatic Reactions, in 3B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS'
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
104.71(1), at 104-107 (1972); Modlin, Psychiatric Reactions to Accidents, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 318 (1967); Palmer, Mental Reactions Following Injuries in Which There Is No Evidence of Damage to Nervous Tissues, in
TRAUMA AND DISEASE: SELECTIONS FROM THE RECENT LITERATURE 81, 85 (A. Moritz
& D. Helberg eds. 1959).
Under a general negligence approach to liability, foreseeability refers to harm in general and not the specific injury which occurs to the plaintiff. See Smith, Relations of
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV.
193, 241-42 (1944).

In regard to emotional distress actions, the defendant's conduct
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BYSTANDER RECOVERY

Although the medical profession determines responsibility for the development of emotional distress by isolating the causal factors, the law requires
more than mere causation in determining liability. 30 Under the general
principles of negligence law a legally protected right must be unreasonably
invaded before liability exists. s ' The determination of this right underlies the
problem of bystander recovery as evidenced by the following hypothesis.
Assume that A and B are crossing the street while C stands on the curb
watching. D negligently strikes A with his automobile while narrowly missing
B. C observes the entire event. Both B and C suffer severe emotional
reactions culminating in a traumatic neurosis. A, B, and C bring suit against
D to recover damages for emotional distress. At one time the courts followed
the "impact rule" and would only allow A to recover for the traumatic
neurosis.3 2 Presently, in the majority of jurisdictions, B would also be able to
recover since B was within the zone of physical danger.a8 The problem
arises, however, in attempting to determine whether the bystander, C, also
has a right to recover. On the one hand, in the vast majority of jurisdictions a
bystander cannot recover in the absence of impact or physical danger. 34 On
the other hand, some courts regard the impact and zone of danger rules as
too rigid and arbitrary, and have allowed bystanders such as C to recover by
adopting a general negligence approach to bystander recovery with the
must have created a substantial and unreasonable risk of "emotional harm" to a normal
individual in the plaintiff's position, before the plaintiff should be allowed recovery.
Once this risk to a normal person is proven, then the plaintiff may recover to the full
extent of his injuries. The problem with this approach lies in the medical fact that normal individuals do not suffer secondary reactions upon witnessing an accident. Only
idiosyncratic plaintiffs suffer secondary reactions because of a traumatic stimulus.
30. Greene, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543,
547-52 (1962).
31. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971).
The determination of whether the right exists and that a duty of care runs from the
defendant to the plaintiff is a question for the court and not the jury. Greene, The
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 543, 570-71 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky. 1929); Herrick
v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 113 A. 16, 17 (Me. 1921); Consolidated Traction
Co. v. Lambertson, 36 A. 100, 102 (N.J. 1896).
33. E.g., Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Del. 1965) (applying Delaware law); Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 317 (D. Colo. 1965) (applying
Colorado law); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (Md. 1952).
34. In denying such recovery the court in Tobin v. Grossman, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
561-62 (1969) cited as pertinent factors the problems of foreseeability of the injury to
the plaintiff bystander, the defendant's unlimited liability, and the difficulty of obtaining
any reasonable circumscription within tolerable limits required by public policy if a rule
creating such liability were adopted. In Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis.
1935) the court denied recovery because of its belief that once recovery was allowed
there would be no end "short of a recovery for every person who has sustained physical
injuries as a result of shock or emotional distress by reason of seeing or hearing of the
peril or injury of another."
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element of foreseeability determining the imposition of liability.8 5 The
general negligence approach, however, has not been developed to its full
potential by these jurisdictions, because of the continual unstated apprehension that this approach will eventually lead to the imposition of absolute
liability. 30 Consequently, although espousing a pure negligence approach
these courts have felt compelled to establish certain limitations upon recovery.
Limitationson Bystander Recovery
The pure negligence approach to bystander recovery was precipitated by
the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg.8 7 There a mother brought
an action to recover damages for the emotional distress suffered when she
witnessed an accident in which her infant daughter was run over by a car.
The court in Dillon dispensed with California's zone of danger rule, basing
the defendant's liability upon general negligence principles. 8 -In doing so,
the court acknowledged the possibility of imposing absolute liability upon a
negligent defendant, and established guidelines for determining when the
occurrence of psychic trauma in a bystander should be foreseeable.8 9 The
court in Dillon recognized three factors as being relevant to the scope of
35. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973); Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 130 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758,
764-65 (Hawaii 1974); Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Mich. Ct. App.
1973). In D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 528 (R.I. 1975) bystander recovery
was allowed on the basis of policy considerations because the court did not feel the principle of foreseeability was suited to determine an essentially moral culpability. Some
jurisdictions, while adopting a general negligence approach to recovery for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress, have stopped short of allowing such recovery to a bystander. Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (Md. 1952); Hughes v. Moore, 197
S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973).
36. See Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-80 (1968) (foreseeability checks unlimited liability); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (R.I. 1975) (zone of
danger requirement or mother-child relationship limits the field of liability).
37. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
38. The court in Dillon stated: "We see no good reason why the general rules of
tort law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long
applied to all other types of injury, should not govern the case now before us." id. at
84. Although the logic of the pure negligence approach to bystander recovery is apparent, other jurisdictions have expressly rejected the Dillon rationale and continue to
deny bystander recovery. See Jelley v. LaFlame, 238 A.2d 728, 730 (N.H. 1968); Tobin
v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969); Whethan v. Bismarok Hosp., 197 N.W.2d
678, 684 (N.D. 1972); Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291, 294 (Wash. 1975). The argument prevailing in these jurisdictions is that "if foreseeability be the sole test, then
once liability is extended the logic of the principle would not and could not remain confined." Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. 1969); accord, Jelley v. LaFlame, 238 A.2d 728, 730 (N.H. 1968); Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291, 294 (Wash.
1975). But see Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 315-17 (D. Colo. 1965)
(reliance upon the principle of foreseeability does not automatically assure that liability
will increase).
39. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
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potential liability: physical proximity, the actual witnessing of the accident,
and the relationship between the victim and the bystander. 40 As these were
only guidelines, the court stressed that the actual limits of liability should
41
be determined on a case by case basis.
The Dillon decision dealt only with the foreseeability of emotional distress
occurring in a bystander. In Leong v. Takasaki,42 the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided that similar considerations should be established to determine
the foreseeability of the presence of the plaintiff at the scene of the accident.
Such foreseeability was to be evaluated by considering: "(1) the child's age,
(2) the type of neighborhood in which the accident occurred, (3) the
familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood, (4) the time of day, and
(5) any other factors which would put the tortfeasor on notice of the witness'
3
presence."4
The principle of foreseeability has been difficult to apply despite the
Dillon and Leong decisions. For example, two recent California cases have
attempted to apply the principle of foreseeability in determining the limits
that should be imposed upon 'bystander recovery. In Archibald v.
Braverman44 a mother arriving on the scene, moments after her son was
negligently injured was allowed recovery for her resulting emotional distress.
The court stated that "fim]anifestly, the shock of seeing a child severely
injured immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as that
experienced in witnessing the accident itself." 45 The second California case,
Powers v. Sissoev,46 involved a 30 to 60 minute period between the accident
and the mother's viewing of her injured daughter. Recovery was not
extended to the parent because the court did not feel the circumstances were
any different from those undergone by "every parent whose child has been
'4 7
injured in a non-observed and antecedent accident."
In both Archibald and Powers, foreseeability was considered in establishing liability. Logically, emotional distress suffered by a mother upon viewing
her injured child 30 minutes after an accident is just as foreseeable as if she
viewed the child one minute after the accident. In actuality, the court in
Powers imposed an arbitrary limitation upon bystander recovery because of
48
a fear of absolute liability.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Id. at 81.

42. 520 P.2d 758 (Hawaii 1974).
43. Id. at 765, quoting D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819-20
(D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).

44. 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Ct. App. 1969).
45. Id. at 725.

46. 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1974).
47. Id. at 874.
48. See id. at 874. A similar arbitrary limitation was imposed in Kelley v. Kokua

Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673 (Hawaii 1975), where the distance of the plaintiff

from the scene of the accident was the determining factor in regard to bystander recov-
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The elements of distance and time are crucial factors in allowing bystander recovery. The type of relationship, however, which exists between the
bystander and the victim of a negligent act is also a determinative factor, in
regard to the foreseeability of emotional distress to a bystander. To date, in
every jurisdiction where bystander recovery has been allowed, with the
exception of Hawaii, the relationship between the victim and the bystander
was parental. 49 The rationale for this limitation seems to be based upon a
two prong test of foreseeability in regard to both the plaintiff's development
of emotional distress"0 and the plaintiff's presence at the scene of the
accident. 51

There is one limitation upon bystander recovery that is not concerned with
the principle of foreseeability but rather with proof of emotional distress.
ery. The court held that due to the plaintiff's distant location from the accident the
emotional distress he suffered could not have been foreseen. Id. at 676. The single
dissenting opinion stated that the court was merely imposing another artificial limit on
liability, and argued that "the decision to limit the defendant's scope of duty is a policy
choice which may be effectuated at too great a price." Id. at 679.
49. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973) (mother-child); Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968) (motherchild); Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 724 .(Ct. App. 1969) (mother-child);
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (parentschild); Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (mother-child);
D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (R.I. 1975) (if bystander is not within
the zone of danger, a mother-child relationship must exist for recovery to be granted);
Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1974, no writ) (mother-child). In Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766
(Hawaii 1974) recovery was granted although the relationship was that of a child-stepgrandmother, the court holding that a blood relationship was not important in Hawaii
where there are close ties between extended family groups.
50. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973) (adopts Dillon guidelines in regard to foreseeability of injury); Dillon
v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (foreseeability of injury governs recovery);
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 130 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (foreseeability of risk is major element). But see D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524,
528 (R.I. 1975) (policy, not foreseeability underlies the solution to bystander recovery).
51. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819 (D.R.J.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1975 (1973) (presence of parent must be foreseeable); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 131 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (mother's presence near child is
foreseeable); Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (parents' presence near child is foreseeable). But in Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766
(Hawaii 1974) the court stated that recovery "should not be contingent upon defendant's
actual knowledge of the plaintiff's presence." The requirement that a parent's presence
also be foreseeable means distinguishing between a very young child whose mother can
be assumed to be near, and a teen-age child whose parents are not assumed to be
nearby. Once again in attempting to impose limits upon liability an irrational distinction has been created. If the presence of parents is a prerequisite, on the basis that
the parent would view the accident, then the problem arises as to a mother who was
inside her house as opposed to one who was present at the scene of the accident. The
possibility of imposing logical limitations upon recovery seems beyond our courts' capability in spite of their faith in the principle of foreseeability. See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 54, at 334-35 (4th ed. 1971).
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This limitation which is imposed to discourage fraudulent claims, 52 requires
that there be a resulting physical injury before damages for negligently
inflicted emotional distress can be recovered. 58 Only Hawaii has dispensed
with this requirement, regarding it as merely another artificial bar to
54
recovery.
Jurisdictions allowing bystander recovery have not avoided the imposition
of arbitrary restrictions, even though espousing a pure negligence approach
to such recovery. The limitations regarding time, distance, relationship, and
injury are just as arbitrary and illogical as the former impact and zone of
danger rules. Perhaps this is an area of the law where a logical approach is
inappropriate. In effect, the small minority of jurisdictions allowing bystander recovery have recognized the unusual aspects of this area of the law by
their inability to apply a logical pure negligence approach to such recovery.
BYSTANDER RECOVERY IN TEXAS

PureNegligence Approach
Texas is not generally recognized as one of the minority jurisdictions
which allow a bystander to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing a negligently inflicted injury. One reason for this oversight has been the
paucity of case law in Texas dealing with the problem. The recent case of
Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon"8 seems to clarify the position of
the Texas courts. There a mother brought suit against an automobile
mechanic for damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of observing
her son run over by another car when he fell out of a moving automobile in
which his mother was also a passenger. The cause of the accident was the
defendant's negligence in repairing the car door. Although Mrs. Simon was a
mere bystander, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals held that recovery
would be allowed based upon the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court in
Hill v. Kimball 6 and Kaufman v. Miller.57 The court considered the
element of foreseeability as the determinative factor in regard to both the
accident and the resultant emotional distress. 58 The court was uncertain
52. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 818 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973).
53. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 818 (D.R.I.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973)

(no recovery for emotional distress unless manifested in physical

symptoms); Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (shock did result in physical
injury); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 130 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973)
(recovery where shock resulted in physical injury).
54. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (Hawaii 1974).

55. 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
56. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
57. 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967).
58. Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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about the Texas Supreme Court's exact position on bystander recovery and
as a consequence of this uncertainty held that Mrs. Simon could also recover
under the zone of danger rule. 59 There was, however, no real need for
uncertainty since a close scrutiny of the Hill and Kaufman cases reveals that
if faced with an identical situation, the Texas Supreme Court would decide
such a case by the general rules of negligence.
In Hill v. Kimball,60 a pregnant woman suffered a miscarriage as a result
of witnessing her landlord's attack upon two of her servants. The issue
confronted by the supreme court was whether recovery should 'be allowed for
a physical injury caused by a "strong emotion of the mind," when such
emotion is negligently inflicted. 61 The court held that recovery should be
granted to the plaintiff since the defendant was negligent in regard to Mrs.
Hill, and his negligence caused a "strong emotion" which resulted in bodily
harm. 62 The unusual facet of the Hill case was that the court regarded the
defendant's assault upon the two servants as being negligent toward the
plaintiff.6 3 This is an important factor because in the majority of cases that
have allowed recovery in a similar situation, the prevailing rationale has
been that the actions of the defendant were willful, not only toward the
injured party but also toward the bystander.6 4 Consequently, Hill v. Kimball
was the beginning of the pure negligence approach in Texas to the problem
of bystander recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.65
This approach was also used to allow recovery for a secondary reaction to
a traumatic stimulus in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter.66 There the plaintiff
was riding in a train car when it collided with another train. Although
uninjured, the plaintiff was frightened and developed a resultant emotional
disability diagnosed as "traumatic neurasthenia. ' 67 The Texas Supreme
Court held that recovery would be allowed if the negligent act was the
proximate case of the injury and the injury should have been foreseen.68
With this decision, the use of a pure negligence approach in determining
liability for emotional distress became established in Texas. 9
59. Id. at 925-26.
60. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
61. Id. at 210, 13 S.W. at 59.
62. Id. at 215, 13 S.W. at 59-60.
63. Id. at 215, 13 S.W. at 59-60.
64. See, e.g., Rogers v. Williard, 223 S.W. 15, 17 (Ark. 1920); Knierim v. Izzo, 174
N.E.2d 157, 164-65 (Ill.
1961); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429, 430-31 (Utah 1916).
65. See Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost in the Law, 12 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 14
(1934). Hill dealt with an actual physical injury and not with a secondary reaction.
The case did lay the foundation, however, for bystander recovery for a secondary reaction. It did so by its pure negligence approach to liability and its recognition of the
effect emotions can have upon a person's well being. See Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210,

13 S.W. 59 (1890).
66.
67.
68.
69.

93 Tex. 239, 54S.W.944 (1900).
ld. at 240-41, 54 S.W. at 944.
Id. at 242, 54 S.W. at 945.
See, e.g., Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex. 1967); Wedgworth
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Hayter did not deal with the problem of bystander recovery. That
particular problem was left relatively untouched until the Texas Supreme
Court decided the case of Kaufman v. Miller.70 There the court denied
recovery to a plaintiff who claimed he had suffered a "conversion reaction
neurosis" due to his fear for another's safety. The court in denying recovery
held that "the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff as a natural and probable consequence of her
negligent conduct."' 71 The court based its decision upon the following: the
plaintiff's emotional shock was from fear for others, the plaintiff was
susceptible to a conversion reaction neurosis, the disabling neurosis developed after the collision, and the disabling neurosis was slow in development. 72 Although the court in Kaufman considered the element of "fear for
others" as one factor in arriving at its decision, it did not hold that bystander
recovery would never be allowed. The court stated:
[W]e would be reluctant to hold at this time that any one of the enumerated factors would of and by itself be sufficient to require a judgment
denying liability. We are satisfied, however, that public
policy is better served by denying liability when all are combined. 73
In effect, the Kaufman case recognizes that bystander recovery for
emotional distress could be awarded if reasonably foreseeable. 74 Although
the Texas Supreme Court has never established clear-cut guidelines in regard
to bystander recovery, the case of Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v.
Simon 75 seems to clarify what that position will be in awarding such
7
recovery. 6
Necessity of Physical Injury
Recovery for emotional distress in Texas is predicated upon a resultant
physical injury suffered by the plaintiff due to the traumatic experience. 77
v. City of Forth Worth, 189 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ
dism'd); Alexander v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 122 S.W. 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1909, no writ).
70. 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967).
71. Id. at 170.
72. Id. at 170-71.
73. Id. at 171.
74. Id. at 167.
75. 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
76. Id. at 926.
77. E.g., Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 99, 194 S.W.2d 546, 548
(1946); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 242, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (1900);

Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 414, 25 S.W. 419, 420 (1894). But see Laney
v. Rush, 152 S.W.2d 491, 493(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, no writ) (physical injury not necessary if the emotional distress was intentionally inflicted). The reasons
for refusing to allow action predicated upon an emotional disturbance without resultant
physical injury are:
(1) [C]laims are regarded as outside wide policy of law, and should be denied
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There have been varying decisions as to what constitutes a sufficient physical
injury to satisfy this requirement. 78 Generally, a medically diagnosed traumatic neurosis that has developed from an emotional shock should suffice to
allow recovery, 79 and even a compensation neurosis has been held compensable under the workmen's compensation statutes.8 0 Whether or not the
Texas courts would allow such recovery in a tort case remains to be seen. 8 '
In regard to predisposition to a secondary reaction, the court in Kaufman v.
Miller8 2 held this factor to be a consideration in denying recovery for a
conversion reaction neurosis.8 3 Once the Texas courts have decided that the
plaintiff has suffered a secondary reaction due to his emotional distress, then
84
recovery is allowed for the secondary and primary reaction.
Although bystander recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress
has apparently been recognized in Texas, the law in this area is still in a
state of development. Of all the jurisdictions espousing such recovery, Texas
is the only one which has not developed a rationale or set of guidelines that
attempts to define the limits of such recovery.
for practical reasons; (2) that the injury is too remote and speculative, and not the
proximate result of wrongful act; and (3) that the injury is vague and uncertain,
and can be simulated, and too much advantage rests with the injured party in proving such injury ...
Houston Elec. Co., v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 98, 194 S.W.2d 546, 547 (1946).
78. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 431-32, 279 S.W.2d 315, 31617 (1955) (nightmares, tremor of closed eyelids, high blood pressure, blacking out);
Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 96-97, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946) (derangement
of nervous system, headaches, brain deterioration); Wedgworth v. City of Fort Worth,
189 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ dism'd) (loss of memory
not sufficient to allow recovery); Alexander v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 122 S.W. 572, 573
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1909, no writ) ("every nerve in my body draws, and finally
my heart becomes weak").
79. See Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923, 926-37 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ) (traumatic depressive reaction characterized by loss of weight, lack of control over swallowing, tears); Sutton Motor Co. v.
Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956, no writ) ("[a] neurosis
. . . together with its attendant physical aches and pains, is [legally] a physical injury or
illness .... ").
80. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins., Co., 146 Tex. 522, 528, 209 S.W.2d 345, 348
(1948); Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Gray, 137 S.W. 729, 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ
ref'd).
The Texas view in regard to compensation neuroses in workmen's compensation cases
is in accord with the majority opinion in this country. E.g., Skelly v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 109 P.2d 622, 624 (Idaho 1941); Armour Grain Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 153
N.E. 699, 702 (Ill. 1926); Morris v. Garden City Co., 62 P.2d 920, 922 (Kan. 1936).
81. See Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164, 171 (Tex. 1967).
82. 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967).

83. Id. at 170. In a workmen's compensation action such predisposition would not

be taken into consideration. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Parr, 30 S.W.2d 305,
308 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt. adopted).
84. See San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Corley, 87 Tex. 432, 435, 29 S.W. 231, 232

(1895); Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631, 636-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-

mont 1956, no writ).
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CONCLUSION

The problems involved in allowing a bystander to recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress have not been solved by the use of a pure
negligence approach to such recovery. Limitations have been imposed upon
such recovery which are just as arbitrary as the ones previously dispensed
with by the courts. Utilization of a pure negligence approach to such
recovery is admittedly a logical approach, but it should now be apparent that
this is an area of the law in which logic does not apply. The doctrine of
negligence, which is rooted in the elements of proximate cause and foreseeability, is impractical unless applied to physically observable events. It is, for
example, foreseeable that driving an automobile in a negligent manner could
cause an injury and if the vehicle strikes someone, proof of causation is
relatively simple. These same elements of foreseeability and proximate cause
are not as applicable when a bystander is attempting to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the negligent infliction of injury to another.
A secondary reaction to a specific traumatic stimulus is not foreseeable and
is in effect an idiosyncratic reaction heavily dependent upon an individual's
prior mental conditioning.
The element of proximate cause has always imposed restrictions upon
liability although a causal relationship did in fact exist between a negligent
act and the resulting harm. The seemingly artificial limitations upon bystander recovery such as the impact doctrine and the zone of danger rule were
merely legal limits upon causation. In fact, the courts in imposing such
restrictions, did so in the belief that a balance must be struck between the
merely negligent defendant and those who claim to be victims of his
negligent act. By allowing bystander recovery for resultant secondary reactions caused by witnessing injury to the initial victim of a negligent act, the
balance has been tipped too far in favor of the claimant and an unfair
burden has been imposed upon a merely negligent defendant.
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